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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the economic impact of alternative ownership structures on
transportation system performance, social welfare, and regulatory needs. Road
pricing, investment, and ownership decisions are jointly considered in an
agent-based evolutionary model applicable to large networks. Results suggest that
a centralized public regime with average-cost pricing is far from socially optimal
with even moderate demand growth. When properly regulated, a completely priva-
tized transportation network could achieve net social benefits close to the theore-
tical optimum and distribute a high percentage of welfare gains to travelers. But an
unregulated private road economy would suffer from higher-than-optimal tolls
and overinvestment.
Key Words: network economics, privatization, road pricing, simulation of
network evolution, transportation financing
1. INTRODUCTION
Whereas recent researchin transportation economics has focused on the optimal
pricing and investment strategies for road networks, a more fundamental economic
issue—road network ownership that defines pricing and investment objectives—
remains inadequately understood. The apparently important problem of identify-
ing the optimal ownership structure given certain network supply and demand
characteristics has not found a satisfactory solution. The ownership of a road
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9network could be public or private, and centralized or decentralized, and it evolves
over time. The presumption that prevailing transportation problems such as
congestion and insufficient funding can be best resolved by the public sector
is unwarranted and may produce less effective policies. A potentially more produc-
tive approach is to carefully examine theoretically sound and practically feasible
road network ownership structures and to implement policies leading to the opti-
mal regime, which could be private-centralized (monopoly), private-decentralized
(competitive market), public-centralized (e.g., decisions made at the highest level
of government or by large jurisdictions only), public-decentralized (e.g., decisions
relegated to smaller jurisdictions), or an arrangement in between these extreme
situations.
Previous research on road ownership has been experiential in nature. Authors
have often based conclusions on the consequences of privatization in other
economic sectors (Roth, 1996) or on empirical observations of the demand and
cost characteristics of existing private roads (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1993).
Winston and Shirley (1998) were able to quantify the welfare loss in urban transit
systems due to inefficiencies inherent to public ownership but did not provide a
model for analyzing road ownership. Theoretical studies on road ownership have
focused on the pricing dynamics between private toll roads and public roads on
small stylized networks (de Palma, 1992; Viton, 1995, Verhoef et al., 1996; de Palma
and Lindsey, 2000). de Palma and Leruth (1989) and Yang et al. (2002) considered
price and capacity competition in congested networks. Levinson (2000) examined
price competition between serial monopolists with revenue-maximizing strategies.
Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) explored interrelations between pricing, capacity
choice, and financing with a small-network model. Zhang and Levinson (2007)
developed an analytical model of transportation network evolution and applied
the model to study pricing dynamics and capacity decisions under alternative
ownership structures. However, the equation systems provided in these theoretical
analyses that capture economic decisions and user behaviors cannot be solved
efficiently for real-world networks.
In contrast with the lack of large-scale road ownership models, private invest-
ment resources have already found several ways to enter real-world road
systems. Although most roads in the United States are currently owned and
operated by government agencies, an emerging trend is characterized by the
development of new private toll roads (e.g., Denver E-470, Texas State Highway
130, The Dulles Greenway, San Diego SR125) and the private takeover=leasing
of existing state-owned roads (e.g., Chicago Skyway, Indiana Turnpike). U.S.
D e p a r t m e n to fT r a n s p o r t a t i o n2 0 0 6s t a t i s t i c ss h o wt h a tm o r et h a n5 0 % of the
current highway mega-projects (>$500 million investment) involve public–
private partnerships. The advances in toll collection technology, needs for
congestion relief, and increased use of alternative-fuel=hybrid vehicles have
made road user charges (tolls, mileage fees, etc.) an increasingly attractive alter-
native to fuel taxes. This transition in revenue mechanism will likely cause a
more decentralized road ownership structure in which private investors and
smaller jurisdictions can participate in network pricing and investment prac-
tices. The issue of optimal road ownership is no longer a purely theoretical
debate and bears practical importance.
L. Zhang and D. Levinson




























































9This paper analyzes the economics of road network ownership and develops a
quantitative model that evaluates the short- and long-run network performance
under various ownership regimes. The performance measures include toll levels,
network growth, investment returns, and social welfare. This research also makes
several methodological contributions to network economics analysis. Different
from the static game-theoretical formulations in most previous studies, a dynamic
agent-based approach applicable to large networks is adopted to simulate road
authorities’ decisions and interdependencies. In particular, the profit-maximizing
behavior of private roads is modeled as the result of an evolutionary learning
process under imperfect information and uncertainty. Another uniqueness in
our approach is the modeling of pricing-investment interdependencies at various
decision points for both public and private roads, a consideration for historical
dependencies in road networks. It is also recognized that private ownership struc-
tures often perform better from a society point of view when they are properly
regulated. Therefore, the model is designed with the capability of assessing regula-
tions on private roads. The agent-based approach for network analysis has been
previously applied to model road pricing (Zhang and Levinson, 2005) and network
capacity growth (Zhang and Levinson, 2003).
Although the proposed model structure can evaluate most mixed-ownership
regimes in real-world networks, this paper considers a grid network for ease of
interpretation and focuses on the comparison between a centralized public regime
where all roads are controlled by a central government and a decentralized private
regime where each road is an independent noncooperative profit-maximizing
entity. Analyses of mixed-ownership regimes and ownership dynamics over time
are left for future research. Neither the centralized public nor the decentralized
private regimes are perfect from a rationality perspective. Under public ownership,
the pricing decisions are constrained by political considerations and do not repre-
sent a first-best scheme. The public investment process pursues maximum welfare
but is subject to revenue-neutral goals. Under private ownership, autonomous
private roads have myopic expectations as they do not have perfect information
about future user demand or their competitors’ decisions.
Various considerations need to be addressed regarding the proper scope of
private sector involvement in road infrastructure. Roads have monopoly power
because they uniquely occupy space. Private roads may exercise their monopoly
power and make socially undesirable pricing and investment decisions. There also
exist barriers to market entry including the significant sunk cost of building new
roads and the uncertain return on road investment especially when a competitor
already exists. Also, equity and safety concerns are not necessarily consistent with
the profit-maximizing objective of private investors, though the private sector has a
reputational incentive to provide safe roads (Block, 1979, 1983). On the other
hand, there are defendable benefits of a decentralized private ownership structure.
Compared with government agencies with political objectives, private roads may be
more willing to adopt innovative pricing schemes. Even though a market economy
of private roads can result in high prices and excess profits in the short run, these
price and profit signals in the long run will attract capital and entrepreneurs to
the transportation sector, which could provide an effective solution to inadequate
funding. The incentives for the private sector to minimize costs and provide
Economics of Road Network Ownership




























































9efficient levels of service through innovation may change the supply curve of the
industry and therefore benefit users. The quantitative evaluation framework devel-
oped in this paper is not comprehensive as it cannot entail all practical considera-
tions. Rather, we suggest it be viewed as a valuable new tool that complements
qualitative analysis of road ownership structures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
agent-based network evolution model with an emphasis on travel demand and
road supply characteristics. Section 3 models the interdependent pricing and
investment strategies of public and private road authorities. When component
models in Sections 2 and 3 are integrated, they are able to simulate the evolu-
tion of a road network under alternative ownership structures and provide
detailed results regarding network performance, pricing dynamics, capacity
growth, and social welfare over time with or without regulatory constraints.
Section 4 demonstrates the model on a grid network under centralized public
and decentralized private regimes. Section 5 summarizes the network simula-
tion findings and discusses their policy implications. A price-ceiling regulation
on private roads is also evaluated in this section. Conclusions are offered at the
end of the paper.
2. A MODEL OF NETWORK EVOLUTION
An overview of model components and their interconnectivity is shown in
Figure 1. Three aspects of the transportation system determine the path of
network evolution: behavior, technology, and policy. A travel demand model cap-
tures the collective consequences of travelers’ behavior and estimates traffic flows
on individual links. All scenarios in the paper consider elastic travel demand with
respect to time and toll. Road owners, public or private, invest toll revenues to
defray road maintenance cost, build new capacity, and=or invest in other sectors
of the economy. After each round of investment decisions, the transportation
network may grow with expanded capacity or degenerate when not properly main-
tained, leading to supply-side changes. A new short-term traffic equilibrium is
achieved every year in the model. If there is no overall travel demand growth,
the network achieves a long-run supply–demand equilibrium when: (1) no user
can reduce travel cost by unilaterally changing behavior; and (2) no private road
owner can increase profit by unilaterally changing road toll or capacity subject
to all applicable regulations; and (3) no public road authority can improve social
welfare by unilaterally changing road toll or capacity subject to all applicable
political constraints.
This section illustrates the demand and cost estimation procedures in the net-
work model with the notation that follows below. Details of pricing and investment
policies under alternative ownership structures are discussed in Section 4. It
should be noted that users in the model are assumed to be homogenous with uni-
form values of time. Several recent studies show that ignoring user heterogeneity
and the possibility of product differentiation may underestimate the benefits of
road pricing and decentralized control (Cohen, 1987; Schmanske, 1993; Arnott
et al., 1994; Daniel, 2001; Small and Yan, 2001; Verhoef and Small, 2004; Zhang
et al., 2007).
L. Zhang and D. Levinson




























































9d( ) cost impedance function in the gravity model; dðti
rsÞ¼e c ti
rs
Ds number of trips destined for zone s
Ei
a revenue (earnings) of link a in year i (dollar)
Ki
a cost of expanding link a in year i (dollar)
f i
a average hourly flow on link a in year i (vehicles=hr)
F i
a capacity of link a in year i (vehicles=hr)
i index of year
j, k parameters in the decentralized pricing model
la length of link a (constant) (km)
mr, ns coefficients in the gravity model
Mi
a cost of maintaining link a in year i (dollar)
Or number of trips produced from zone r
qi
rs demand from origin r to destination s in year i
ti
a generalized travel cost on link a in year i
ti
rs generalized travel cost from zone r to s
vi
a free-flow speed of link a (km=hr) in year i
a1–2 coefficients in the maintenance cost function
Figure 1. Flowchart of the simulation model.
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9/ scale parameter in the expansion cost function
c coefficient in the impedance function
k value of travel time (dollar=hr)
h1–2 coefficients of the BPR travel time function
q scale parameter in the centralized pricing model
r1–3 coefficients in the expansion cost model
si
a link toll per vehicle defined in year i (dollar; see equation 4)
l scale parameter in maintenance cost function
p1–2 profit gains for private roads
x1–2 coefficients in the capacity-speed model
w coefficient to scale hourly flows to annual flows
2.1. Travel Demand
We choose a traditional four-step model of travel demand because it has been
calibrated and validated for many regions, recognizing that more advanced
demand models are available (Kitamura, 1998; Boyce, 2002; Zhang and Levinson,
2004). The selected four-step model has a single mode (which we can think of as
drive-alone), a zone-based regression structure for trip generation, a doubly con-
strained gravity model for trip distribution, and an origin-based user equilibrium
traffic assignment algorithm (Bar-Gera and Boyce, 2003). The origin-destination
(OD) cost table obtained from traffic assignment in year i is used for trip distribu-
tion in year iþ1 in the network simulation. The gravity model and the link travel
cost function are specified in equations (1) and (2), respectively. Coefficients in
the travel demand model are extracted from the Twin Cities metropolitan area
planning model and summarized in Table 1.
qi
rs ¼ mrOrnsDs   dðti
rsÞð 1Þ
Table 1. Model coefficients.
Parameter Value Source
k 10 Empirical finding
h1, h2 0.15, 4 BPR Function
c 0.1 Empirical finding
q 0.005 Scale parameter
w 3650 Scale parameter
/ 1 Scale parameter
l 20 Scale parameter
a1 1 CRS of link length
a2 1.25 DRS of capacity
r1 0.5 Empirical finding
r2 1.25 Empirical findings
r3 1 CRS of additional capacity
x1, x2  30.6, 9.8 Empirical estimates
k, j 5, 0.2 Link behavior assumptions
CRS: Constant Return to Scale; DRS: Decreasing Return to Scale.
L. Zhang and D. Levinson











































































The functional forms for the cost functions are chosen based on project-level
cost data collected in the Twin Cities metropolitan area in Minnesota (Levinson
and Karamalaputi, 2003). The same data set is also used to estimate and validate
the coefficients in the construction cost function.
The link maintenance cost function (using a Cobb–Douglas functional form)
has two determining factors: link length and capacity. It costs more to maintain
a link at its current level of service if the link is longer and carries heavier flow
Mi




There is limited empirical evidence on road maintenance cost at the individual
link level. The bulk of the maintenance budget is typically spent on high-capacity
roads (freeways and major arterials) due to their higher design standards and
the reconstruction=rehabilitation needs of bridges and overpasses. Although there
may be economies of scale in repaving roads, the existence of high-maintenance
structures for high-capacity roads causes diseconomies of scale of maintenance cost
with respect to link capacity (a2>1). The current Cobb–Douglas maintenance cost
model could be replaced with engineering cost models such as the one in the
Highway Economic Requirement System (HERS).
Link expansion cost is considered a function of link length, existing link capa-
city, and the additional amount of capacity to be expanded:
Ki
a ¼ /  ð laÞ
r1  ð F i
aÞ
r2  ð F iþ1
a   F i
aÞ
r3: ð4Þ
In the empirical expansion cost model developed for the Twin Cities, Minne-
sota (Levinson and Karamalaputi, 2003), it is shown that construction cost
has economies of scale with respect to the length of the road (r1<1) and that
it is more expensive to expand the same amount of capacity for higher-level
high-capacity roads than for lower-level roads (r2 >1). Although the Twin Cities
model suggests economies of scale with respect to additional link capacity, there
has also been empirical evidence of increasing, constant, and decreasing
returns to scale (Keeler and Small, 1977; Kraus, 1981; Newbery, 1989;
Small et al., 1989; Levinson and Gillen, 1998; Small, 1999). The general consen-
sus among transportation economists is t h a tt h em a r g i n a lc o s to fa na d d i t i o -
nal capacity unit is not far from constant, if it is not constant (Verhoef and
Rouwendal, 2004). We therefore set r3 to be one in the model, which implies
perfect self-financing in the socially optimal scenario, i.e., the amount of
marginal cost toll revenue just recovers the construction cost. It should also
be noted that capacity is treated as a discrete variable in the model; that is,
capacity only increases with one or more additional lanes.
Economics of Road Network Ownership




























































93. PRICING AND INVESTMENT POLICIES
3.1. Centralized Public Control
Under centralized control, a government agency manages all roads, makes
pricing decisions, and spends on road maintenance and construction based on a
budget. This ownership scenario is constructed to approximately replicate the
existing public road financing practices in the United States. Therefore, marginal
cost pricing is not assumed. Interested readers may refer to Montes de Oca and
Levinson (2006) for a detailed account of the network expansion decision-making
process in the Twin Cities.
3.1.1. Pricing Policy: Average Cost Pricing
Under centralized control, users pay fuel taxes and registration fees for using
the roads, which can be modeled as a distance-based charge when the variations
in vehicle fuel efficiency are assumed away:
si
a ¼ q   la: ð5Þ
This pricing equation represents an average-cost-pricing practice. Cost per
kilometer of travel is the same no matter where or when trips occur. Revenue from
each link is then collected, which is simply the product of the toll and annual
traffic flow on the link:
Ei
a ¼ si
a  ð w   f i
aÞ; ð6Þ
where w is a scale parameter that converts hourly flows to annual flows.
3.1.2. Investment Policy: Benefit–Cost Analysis and Budget Balancing
Revenues collected on all public roads are pooled together, and a central
government agency makes all investment decisions. The public authority can
always adjust the taxes so that the overall network revenue is higher than the cost
for maintaining all links in the system. The remaining revenue after necessary
maintenance activities is spent to expand road capacity according to benefit–cost
analysis.
The maximum possible benefit=cost ratio (BCmax) of expanding a link, as well as
the corresponding ‘‘optimal’’ amount of expansion (DF  ), is computed based on
the construction cost function and the following assumptions: (1) Discount rate
is 8%; (2) the newly expanded capacity will produce benefits for 25 years; (3) only
local (on the same link) travel time benefits are considered. Under these assump-
tions, the benefit=cost ratio becomes a single-variable convex function of the
amount of capacity increase. BCmax and DF   can then be analytically solved. The
public road with the highest BCmax is expanded first. The link with the next highest
BCmax is then expanded, and so on until the revenue is exhausted. This implies
that at the end of each year, the centralized government agency has a balanced
budget with no deficit or surplus. Obviously, it is possible for this budget-balancing
invest policy to cause underinvestment or overinvestment in the network. However,
this nonoptimal investment model is consistent with current public financing
practices that seek revenue-neutral goals.
L. Zhang and D. Levinson




























































9When roads are expanded, the capacity increase is usually associated with a
concurrent change of free-flow speed. For instance, free-flow speeds on
higher-capacity roads such as divided arterials and freeways are higher than those
of lower-capacity roads. This positive correlation is estimated with speed and
capacity data used by the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in their regional
planning models on more than 10,000 roadway sections. A parsimonious log-linear
model provides the best goodness-of-fit:
vi
a ¼ x1 þ x2   lnðF i
aÞ: ð7Þ
3.2. Decentralized Private Control and Regulation of Private Roads
3.2.1. Pricing Policy: Short-Run Profit-Maximizing
When setting tolls, private roads under decentralized ownership take road
capacity as given and seek to maximize their short-run profits in an imperfectly
competitive market. This analysis does not adopt a game-theoretic approach to
compute profit-maximizing prices because obtaining the Nash-type equilibrium
solutions would be computationally difficulty (if possible at all) on large networks
and require strong simplifying assumptions about the availability of current=future
information. In a market economy consisting of many private roads, any individual
private investor does not possess perfect knowledge about other investors’ road
pricing and capacity expansion decisions, which causes uncertainty about the
demand curves on individual private roads.
We alternatively model private roads’ profit-maximizing pricing behavior as the
outcome of an adaptive learning process. In this approach, a private link in the
network copes with uncertainty and imperfect information by learning demand
patterns from historical road usage data under road tolls set in the past. The
collective influence of the decisions by other private roads is represented by the
shape of the link-specific demand curve (i.e., link flow versus generalized link
travel cost). The process through which the private link adjusts its toll to maximize
profit is depicted in Figure 2. Due to traffic growth and=or new pricing=investment
decisions by other links, the demand curve on the private link shifts over time.
Therefore in each time period, the private link estimates a new demand curve
based on its own link flows and tolls in the previous k time periods (represented
by crosses in the graph) with linear line-fitting techniques. The k previous tolls fall
into a range [Plow, PHigh]. The estimated demand curve can be extrapolated beyond
this toll range (the dashed portions on the demand curve). Based on this empirical
demand curve learned from experience, a standard quadratic optimization proce-
dure finds the theoretical profit-maximizing toll, P  , for the next time period. If
P  2[Plow, PHigh] (case A in Fig. 2), it is directly implemented as new toll. However,
if P   is in a new price territory (case B), the link will take caution and adjust its toll
toward P 
B only by a conservative small step j to PLow(1–j), where j is a parameter.
Similarly, if P 
B is higher than PHigh (not shown in Fig. 2), the new toll would be
PHigh(1þj).
This pricing rule assists private roads to maximize profit and keep the price
changes smooth. It should be a plausible pricing rule when the uncertainty
about future travel demand abounds. For instance, the private road toll on
Economics of Road Network Ownership




























































9the Dulles Greenway has been adjusted up and down several times due to un-
expected demand conditions (FHWA, 2006). Computationally, this learning-
based adaptive pricing policy can be efficiently executed on networks with a
large number of links. The impact of toll regulations can also be easily incor-
porated, as we shall see later in the paper when a price-ceiling regulation is
introduced. However, the heuristic nature of this adaptive pricing rule may
introduce estimation biases when demand curves shift abruptly or consistently
in the same direction for a long period of time. Future research should both
explore the theoretically optimal pricing strategy for private roads under
uncertainty and analyze the real-world pricing practices of existing toll-road
operators.
3.2.2. Investment Rule: Long-Run Profit-Maximizing
Capacity expansion allows private links to increase revenue by charging
higher tolls, attracting more traffic, or both at the expense of expansion and
additional maintenance costs. If the rate of investment return is higher than
the discount rate, a private link should expand its capacity with toll revenue
or by borrowing from other investors. Otherwise, the private link should invest
toll revenue elsewhere. These investment options for private roads are made
possible in our model by a bank agent. The bank agent pays interest for savings
and upon request lends money to links with potentially profitable capacity
expansion projects.
While the life-cycle cost of private road expansion can be computed from cost
functions, the additional toll revenue from the added capacity depends on the
traffic growth rate and other links’ economic decisions. The following procedure
Figure 2. Profit-maximizing pricing under uncertainty.
L. Zhang and D. Levinson




























































9estimates the expected profit from capacity expansion with consideration of uncer-
tainty and imperfect information:
1. Assume the current link demand curve will not change significantly during the
life cycle of the capacity expansion project.
2. Compute travel time reductions for users under all feasible discrete capacity
expansion scenarios (e.g., adding one or two more lanes).
3. Apply the link demand curve to estimate the increased amount of traffic with
reduced travel time and unchanged toll. Calculate the amount of profit gain
during the project life cycle due to the increased link traffic, p1.
4. Convert an average user’s time saving on the link following capacity expansion
to a monetary value Ds. Increase the link toll by Ds, which should keep traffic
flow unchanged. Compute the profit gain during the project life cycle due to
the higher link toll, p2.
5. The final estimated profit gain is the maximum of p1 and p2.
The rationale behind this profit estimation procedure is as follows. The extra
profit with added capacity results from increased traffic and=or increased toll.
The above procedure finds the profit gains when either one of those two profit
sources is completely exploited. Future research should examine the possibility
of exploiting both sources at once, which should produce even higher estimates
of profit gains. Assumption (1) is a simplification. More intelligent private road
operators may better adjust their capacities and anticipate likely future demand
curve shifts according to past observations.
The profit-maximizing pricing and investment strategies modeled in this section
are hybrid strategies based on heuristic rules, learning, and optimization princi-
ples. The simulation results presented in Section 5 later in the paper show that
these hybrid strategies serve the profit-maximizing objective very well. For instance,
private roads on the test network are able to keep more than 75% of total welfare
gains as their profits when there is no regulation.
3.2.3 Regulation on Private Roads
As discussed in the introduction, private roads possess spatial monopoly power
and will likely charge higher-than-optimal tolls on their users, leading to welfare
losses. In addition, market entry barriers due to high construction cost and
demand uncertainty imply that the private road economy is not a perfect market.
Therefore, comparing a centralized public ownership with an unregulated private
ownership is not fair because in theory, proper regulations on private roads can
improve welfare. There are various types of regulations on private roads, with price
ceiling, fixed profit, cap on rate-of-return, and shadow tolls being the most popular
(FHWA, 2006). Limited by the length of the paper, we will only consider the price
ceiling regulation in which a global maximum toll level (e.g., $3 per km) is set for
all private roads.
For any regulatory policy, there is also the issue of optimal regulation. In the
case of price ceiling, the optimal ceiling price that maximizes social welfare needs
to be determined so that the full potential of the regulation can be appreciated.
When the ceiling price is too high, its influence on private roads’ pricing and
investment decisions is marginal. When it is too low, private roads may not be
Economics of Road Network Ownership




























































9willing to expand an under-built network to the optimal capacity level. We identify
the optimal ceiling price by simulating a large number of alternative ceiling prices
(i.e., from $0t o$10 per km in $0.1 increments) and evaluating the corresponding
welfare measures. Although a global ceiling price for all links is assumed herein for
simplicity, the optimal ceiling price in theory could vary on a link-by-link basis.
3.3. Socially Optimal Pricing and Investment Policies
A socially optimal scenario is included in the analysis to estimate the maximum
possible welfare and serve as a benchmark. Overall social welfare or net social
benefit consists of consumers’ surplus and suppliers’ surplus. Changes in consu-
mers’ surplus are computed using the ‘‘rule of half’’ (Neuburger, 1971) under
the assumption of a linear demand curve. Annual toll revenue after the amortized
expansion and maintenance costs are subtracted provides an estimate of suppliers’
surplus or profit. The optimal pricing policy in a first-best environment is marginal
cost pricing, which is estimated by the link travel time savings when a single user is
removed from the link. It should be noted the true system-wide marginal cost of an
additional trip can be different from the local link-level marginal cost (Safirova
and Gillingham, 2003). The capacity of a link is at optimum if the marginal cost
of building one extra unit of capacity just equals the marginal benefit. The socially
optimal investment policy defined herein is similar to the public investment strat-
egy described in Section 3.1.2 except that the budget balancing constraint is
removed. When there is still residual revenue after all capacity expansion projects
with rates of investment return larger than the discount rate have been implemen-
ted, the residual revenue is saved (presumably allocated to other more desirable
public investment projects) rather than invested inefficiently for additional
capacity expansion. In this optimal scenario, the public road authority may also
allocate funds from outside the transportation system to socially desirable capacity
expansion projects when toll revenues are insufficient.
4. DESCRIPTION OF SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
The network evolution model is readily applicable to large real-world networks.
The amount of time required to run the model for a single time period is slightly
longer than what is required to run a traditional four-step model. A 10 10 grid
network (100 nodes and 360 links) is used in this paper to explore the
consequences of alternative ownership structures for ease of interpretation (e.g.,
the effect of spatial monopoly is easier to observe on a grid network than on an
irregular real-world network). Each link in the grid network is 3.2-km long and
has an initial capacity of 735 vehicles=hour (this value corresponds with the
capacity of the average one-lane road according to a regression analysis using
the capacity and number-of-lane data in the Twin Cities regional planning model).
The initial network is moderately congested with an average volume=capacity ratio
of 0.8. The initial land use is uniform among all 100 zones (each node is also a
zone centroid) with 10,000 trips originating from and destined for each zone.
Although the use of a grid network loses to a real-world network on realism and
the immediate applicability of research findings, it wins on the elimination of
confounding and conflating factors and the convenience of running a large
L. Zhang and D. Levinson




























































9number of scenarios within a relatively short amount of time. But it should be
noted that the OD demand matrix for a grid network where short trips are more
frequent than long trips may not adequately represent the demand patterns in cer-
tain real-world cities. In some cases, a circular city network would be more realistic
than the rectangular grid employed in our simulation experiments.
Two sets of simulation experiments are conducted. The first set assumes no
overall travel demand growth (referred to as the no-growth scenario hereafter).
The long-term supply-demand equilibrium can be achieved in this case when
all equilibrium conditions listed at the beginning of Section 2 are satisfied.
The second set of experiments assumes the overall network travel demand
increases at an annual rate of 3% (the growth scenario, i.e., Or and Ds in equation
(1) increase uniformly across all zones by 3% every year). With demand growth,
the road network would continuously evolve over time without achieving an
equilibrium state. The same initial network condition is specified for all simula-
tion scenarios. Four experiments are conducted for each demand growth
scenario: (1) centralized public regime; (2) decentralized private regime without
regulation; (3) decentralized private regime with price-ceiling regulation; and (4)
socially optimal.
5. RESULTS
5.1. The No-Growth Scenario
It should be noted again that even in the no-growth scenario, the demand
curves for individual links still shift over time. Figure 3 plots the link tolls and capa-
cities after the long-run supply–demand equilibria are achieved. The marginal-cost
tolls are higher on links in the center of the grid as they attract more traffic and
have higher levels of congestion than do links on the edges. The socially optimal
capacity distribution is quite (though not perfectly) flat, which is largely explained
by the assumed uniform land-use pattern in all zones. Under centralized control,
we can observe capacities significantly lower than the optimum levels. Apparently,
when the average-cost price implemented as distance-based tolls or fuel taxes is
lower than the optimal marginal-cost price (which is the case in congested net-
works), it cannot generate sufficient revenues for all desirable network capacity
expansions. Quantitative analysis of network evolution under decentralized con-
trol has not been available previously. It is therefore interesting to examine the last
two graphs in Figure 3. The profit-maximizing capacity is almost the same as the
optimal capacity on the edges of the network, and overinvestment can be observed
in the center. The higher level of competition among the central links accounts for
their higher-than-optimal capacity. On the other hand, tolls are higher in the
decentralized private regime, which should reduce traffic volumes and hence
the benefit from capacity expansion in terms of congestion relief. The difference
between regimes in investment levels is the net effect of these opposing forces. The
imperfection of the private road economy is exemplified in the equilibrium toll
graphs in Figure 3. The spatial monopoly power of roads is evident and most
obvious on the edge and corner links where travelers have fewer or no choices
for service. These links are able to maximize profits by charging very high tolls with
Economics of Road Network Ownership




























































9minimum capacity expansion. For the central links, competition forces them to
charge tolls closer to the marginal congestion cost.
Figure 4 presents key measures of network effectiveness over time. An evolution-
ary analysis of the equilibration process provides a unique opportunity to examine
the strengths and weaknesses of specific ownership structures. While the socially
optimal and centralized control scenarios quickly achieve stable equilibria after
a few years, the decentralized control cases take much longer time to converge.
Because the initial network is congested, the marginal congestion tolls are very
high in the beginning. The resulting abundance of toll revenue then allows
road capacities to be quickly expanded to their optimal levels within several years.
Figure 3. Equilibrium tolls and capacity in the no-growth scenario.
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9The centralized control scenario displays slow responses to congestion but even-
tually achieves a net social benefit about 85% of the maximum possible. The issue
of under-built capacity under centralized control is evident in the graph plotting
the cumulative number of capacity expansion projects (i.e., number of times the
Figure 4. Network evolution in the no-growth scenario.
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9links in the network are expanded). The pricing and investment behavior of
private roads in the decentralized road economy are almost identical to the socially
optimal case during the first 10 years. Observing congestion and the opportunity
to increase profit by capacity expansion, they immediately borrow from investors to
expand network capacity to a nearly socially optimal level. However, they gradually
learn the profitability of higher tolls under no regulation. High tolls bring signifi-
cant profits that pay off loans. The residual profits are not immediately reinvested
in the transportation system until after year 25. Road users suffer from high tolls.
Net social benefit drops to almost zero in year 20 when the average private road
toll peaks. Eventually, competition in the network among private roads leads to
steady toll reductions. The average private road toll finally stabilizes around
$2.85 per link (or $0.89 per km).
The above equilibrium and evolutionary analyses clearly show that the
inefficiencies of the unregulated private regime result from higher-than-optimal
tolls and subsequent overinvestment in capacity. The following section summarizes
the role of price-ceiling regulations in preventing these socially inefficient
outcomes.
5.2. The Role of Regulation
If we compare the curves under the private regimes with and without regulation
in Figure 4, it is clear that the optimal ceiling price is very effective in preventing
high tolls and overinvestment. Figure 5 illustrates the influence of various global
ceiling prices on net social benefit, consumers’ surplus, and private road profit.
The socially optimal ceiling price is about $2.0 per km. At this ceiling price, the
net social benefit is about 84% of the maximum possible and rivals that under cen-
tralized control (85%). In addition, the percentage of net social benefit attributa-
ble to consumers’ surplus is about 83% when the optimal ceiling price is adopted.
Because these findings are based on a simple regulatory scheme, it is reasonable to
believe that more sophisticated regulation schemes (e.g., link-specific ceiling tolls)
Figure 5. Determination of the optimal ceiling price.
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9would allow the decentralized private regime to outperform the centralized public
regime.
A somewhat unexpected observation is that profit for private roads appears to
be a bimodal function of the ceiling price with two local maxima on the test net-
work. This deserves further discussion. When ceiling prices are low (<$1.2=km),
private roads do not have incentives to expand capacities toward the optimal levels.
Consequently, as the ceiling price increases within this low range, they simply raise
tolls to gain more profit, which leads to the first local profit maximum. When the
ceiling price continues to increase above $1.2=km, the noncooperative competi-
tion among private roads forces them to build more capacity but only charge mod-
erate tolls (as constrained by the moderate ceiling price). Profit therefore
decreases to a minimum at the $2.0=km ceiling price. When the ceiling price
becomes higher than $2.0=km, private tolls continue to increase at the higher
capacity level, leading to the second local profit maximum at the $3.5=km ceiling
price. This finding on the complexity of the profit-maximizing problem for private
roads in a market economy suggests that the same level of profit can be achieved at
multiple toll rates. An implication is that in order to capture the highest possible
profit, private roads may need to probe the market periodically by adjusting
their tolls.
5.3. The Growth Scenario
Travel demand in many urban areas has been increasing at a fast pace over the
past several decades, and this trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
Therefore from a practical point of view, it is more relevant to evaluate network
performance in the growth scenario than in the no-growth scenario. Simulation
experiments in the growth scenario reveal how well the public and private owner-
ship regimes can handle rapidly changing demand conditions. Figure 6 presents
the evolutionary paths of the grid network under the two alternative ownership
regimes. Apparently, the network will not achieve an equilibrium in the growth
scenario.
The problems associated with the centralized public regime, namely subop-
timal prices and insufficient revenue for capacity expansion that we have
already observed in the no-growth scenario, get worse with demand growth. If
the current public funding level continues into the future, the centralized
public road network would exhibit disappointing performance even worse than
that of a decentralized private network without any regulation. These findings
on the test network favor private-sector involvements in network financing in
rapidly growing areas.
The responsiveness of private roads to changing demand conditions is a major
benefit under decentralized control. Though earlier-than-optimal investment
occurs around year 15 due to high tolls and hence higher expected returns on
capacity investment, the total capacity expansion projects, measured by the cumu-
lative number of times links have already been expanded, are not far from the
optimal level most of the time. A small price spike can still be observed in the
private market economy between years 15 and 30. However, the average link toll
under the private control overlaps with the socially optimal tolls for a significant
period of time.
Economics of Road Network Ownership





























































This research develops an agent-based model to study the welfare consequences of
alternative ownership policies for road networks. The evolution of a transportation
network consisting of profit-maximizing private roads in a market economy is
Figure 6. Network evolution in the growth scenario.
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9analyzed and modeled. The paper jointly considers pricing schemes, investment
strategies, and ownership structures in an integrated analytical framework applic-
able to large networks, which has not been studied despite its obvious policy signifi-
cance. Discussions of road privatization and its various consequences have long
been conducted at the theoretical and conceptuallevels. The quantitative approach
for road ownership analysis developed herein provides a valuable analytical method
and complements the qualitative approaches.
Findings from a grid network should encourage those in favor of a market-
oriented approach to solving urban transportation problems. However, the goal
of profit-maximization, the existence of spatial monopoly, complex interdepen-
dencies, and severe competition could all cause private roads in a market economy
to adopt socially nonoptimal tolls and capacities. Yet, even a rudimentary
price-ceiling regulation is shown to be capable of overcoming many of the draw-
backs of a decentralized private regime. Private roads in a market economy are
particularly robust in areas with increasing travel demand. These conclusions
should be tested by future studies on real-world urban road networks.
One limitation of the research is that users are assumed to be homogenous with
the same value of time. This could affect the results in two ways. Disregarding user
heterogeneity prohibits analysis of certain equity impacts on users, and equity is an
important part of social welfare. It also prevents product differentiation in the
transportation network and generally causes underestimation of total welfare in
a market economy. Another limitation is that cooperation among private roads
is assumed away. There may be advantages to both the private and social welfare
if vertical integration of highly complementary links is allowed in the system.
However the degree of complementarity for which integration serves both public
and private interests remains to be determined. The questions of when and how a
link seeks coalitions at the microscopic level and how road network evolves with
changing ownership structures need to be answered. However, it would be interest-
ing to observe in future research what kind of organizational structure will emerge
in a market economy to take advantage of the economies of scale in the network.
Other interesting extensions for future research include simulating mixed public–
private ownership structures and comparing a Nash-type equilibrium and the
simulation model outcome on a stylized network.
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